The bid opening for the Ulaanbaatar Metro construction contractor and the participation of South Korean companies on April 30, 2025, demonstrated a clear strategic synergy and practical connection with Woo Won-shik’s visit to Mongolia that same month.

In essence, South Korean National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik’s visit in April 2025 was a key manifestation of South Korea’s “technological geopolitics” strategy, pursued through “parliamentary diplomacy,” during a period marked by domestic constitutional crisis and regional geopolitical shifts in Northeast Asia. Rooted in institutional cooperation and focused on technology export, it aimed to reshape the Korea-Mongolia “technology-resource” symbiotic relationship. However, its long-term impact remains constrained by the trajectory of South Korean domestic politics and the dynamic balance of Mongolia’s “multi-pillar” foreign policy.   

1. Deepening Institutional Cooperation and Institutionalized Assurance

Breakthroughs in Institutionalizing Parliamentary Diplomacy Woo Won-shik promoted the establishment of the “South Korea-Mongolia Parliamentary Strategic Dialogue Mechanism,” setting up biennial Speaker-level talks and dedicated legislative working groups. This brought cooperation areas such as rare earth development and smart greenhouses under parliamentary oversight. Both sides signed agreements, including the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement and the Rare Earth Cooperation Framework Agreement, providing policy preferences for South Korean companies, such as tax reductions and expedited approvals, directly enhancing their competitiveness in bids like the Ulaanbaatar Metro project. The visit also provided legal safeguards for major projects totaling around $2 billion, including the Ulaanbaatar Subway ($1.3 billion) and some mining ventures. Amendments to Mongolia’s “Mineral Law” are planned to increase the profit-sharing ratio for South Korean companies and allow technical personnel visa-free stays for 6 months, ensuring the continuity and stability of cooperation at an institutional level.

Woo Won-shik’s visit took place from April 26–30, 2025, strategically coinciding with the April 28 deadline for submitting bids in the first stage of the Ulaanbaatar Metro construction tender—where 27 companies from 7 countries, including South Korean firms such as Samsung C&T Corporation, Hyundai Rotem, and LS Electric, participated—creating a tight “high-level diplomacy – corporate bidding” temporal window. As Mongolia’s first metro line, the Ulaanbaatar Metro Line 1 is critical: the city’s population surged to 1.67 million in 2024 (47% of the national total), with an annual growth rate of 2–3% projected through 2030, leading to severe traffic congestion and air pollution. Spanning 19 kilometers with 15 stations and designed for a top speed of 39.2 km/h, the line aims to drastically reduce commute times—from 40 minutes by bus to 10 minutes by metro—cut traffic congestion by 75%, curtail private vehicle use, and improve air quality upon its scheduled completion in 2030.

Party Politics and Policy Continuity Risks The parliamentary cooperation mechanism, led by the Democratic Party of Korea, faces inherent challenges from the conservative opposition. Conservatives advocate for linking rare earth exports to the US-Japan-ROK security supply chain, which could delay revisions to the “South Korea-Mongolia Investment Protection Agreement,” affecting the return on investment for Korean companies. If the progressive party governs, the “technology-for-resources” approach is likely to continue; if conservatives take power, they might push for security cooperation like “THAAD radar networking,” which would cross Mongolia’s “neutral country” red line and risk geopolitical confrontation.

1. Deepening Industrial Chain Integration and Economic Cooperation Upgrade

Trade Structure Imbalance Dominated by Technology Exports According to South Korean customs data, bilateral trade between South Korea and Mongolia reached $617 million in 2024 (+14.5%). South Korean exports accounted for $582 million (+22.1%), primarily consisting of technology-intensive products such as railway signaling systems and smart greenhouse equipment, directly serving Mongolia’s core infrastructure projects. Imports from Mongolia were only $35.37 million (-43.7%), concentrated in primary resources like coal and copper concentrate. The trade surplus widened to $546 million, highlighting the absolute dominance of South Korean technology exports and Mongolia’s low reliance on resource exports via the Korean route.

Technology-Resource Symbiosis in Rare Earths and Infrastructure South Korea is promoting the inclusion of Mongolian rare earths (31 million tons in reserves, accounting for 16% of global reserves) into the “Balancing Chinese” supply chain through the “South Korea-US-Mongolia Trilateral Mechanism.” It is exporting rare earth separation and purification technology to help Mongolia establish independent processing capacity. Although logistics costs via Busan Port are 35% higher than the China route, railway intelligent upgrades (expected to increase transport efficiency by 40% by 2028) and port rent reductions (30%) are gradually enhancing competitiveness. The Ulaanbaatar metro utilizes South Korea’s KTX signaling system, and smart greenhouse projects have increased Mongolia’s vegetable self-sufficiency from 30% to 50%, forming a long-term dependence loop of “technology service – resource feedback.”

Countermeasures by China and Russia and Mongolia’s Strategic Balance China has reduced Mongolia’s resource transportation costs to 65% of the South Korean route through the “China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor.” In 2024, China-Mongolia trade accounted for 91.6% of Mongolia’s total exports, significantly diverting potential cargo away from Korea. Russia is strengthening energy ties through the “Eurasian Economic Union” (energy trade accounts for 68%). Mongolia’s sharp 43.7% decline in exports to South Korea reflects its continued reliance on Chinese and Russian channels for resource exports. Meanwhile, its “traditional diplomacy” towards Pyongyang (including secretly transporting 104 calves in 2014) demonstrates its “multi-pillar” foreign policy’s maintenance of historical ties.   

III. Mutual Influence of Humanistic Ties and Overseas Citizen Policy

Technical Talent Cultivation & Livelihood Collaboration The two countries have launched diverse scholarship programs, annually funding Mongolian students to pursue engineering studies in South Korea. A flagship initiative is Halla University’s partnership with Mongolia’s University of Science and Technology, where 110 Mongolian students per year receive dual training: academic coursework in Mongolia followed by practical education at South Korean firms like Woojin Industrial Systems, which provides electrical equipment training platforms. This creates a “government-university-enterprise” tripartite network, ensuring graduates gain both theoretical knowledge and hands-on technical skills aligned with industry needs.

Additionally, the “Korea-Mongolia Youth Leaders Program” establishes a closed-loop talent pipeline, focusing on cultivating future technical elites for sectors like mining and infrastructure. By integrating corporate internships, research grants, and policy dialogues, the program aims to produce professionals who can drive long-term “technology-resource” synergies.

Optimized medical visa policies—featuring online applications and waived financial guarantees—are set to boost Mongolian medical tourism in South Korea. Estimates project over 15,000 annual medical visitors by 2025, generating $120 million in annual healthcare revenue. These measures deepen people-to-people reliance in technical and health domains, injecting humanistic momentum into the broader “technology-resource” cooperation framework.

Visa Policy Controversy and Trust Challenges South Korea’s “Immigration Control Act” has led to a visa rejection rate of up to 18% for Mongolian citizens. If conservatives strengthen “national security screening,” it could exacerbate dissatisfaction among the Mongolian public. During elections, parties may instrumentalize overseas citizen policies (such as balancing visa facilitation with control of illegal stays), potentially causing policy reversals that affect the stable lives of the 50,000 Mongolian residents in South Korea and undermine the foundation of bilateral technical talent flow.

1. Risks and Strategic Opportunities in the Geopolitical Landscape: Divergence under Party Rotation

Progressive Party Governance: Continuation of Pragmatism and Easing Tensions with North Korea If Lee Jae-myung is elected (more than 46% support in May 2025 polls), his “Security with US, Economy with China” strategy will continue the “technology-for-resources” approach, focusing on advancing South Korea-Mongolia EPA negotiations and deepening rare earth processing and smart greenhouse cooperation. Lee Jae-myung advocates for “economic cooperation to ease geopolitical tension” and may put security measures like “THAAD radar station deployment” on hold, leaving buffer space for North Korea-Mongolia relations, reducing North Korea’s security anxiety, and maintaining a “technology cooperation first” non-zero-sum game in Northeast Asia.

Conservative Party Governance: Security-First Shift and Strained North Korea-Mongolia Relations If Kim Moon-soo takes office, he may integrate Mongolia-South Korea cooperation into the US-Japan-ROK trilateral framework, promoting the networking of the “THAAD” early warning system with Mongolian radar stations, or even conducting joint military exercises. This action would cross Mongolia’s “neutral country” red line and could provoke North Korea to strengthen its military alliance with China and Russia, deploying tactical missiles along the China-Mongolia border, creating military deterrence, and leading South Korea into a dual predicament of “technology cooperation stalled, security isolation deepened.”

Mongolia’s Strategic Autonomy: A Balancing Act Refusing to Take Sides Regardless of changes in South Korean politics, Mongolia maintains its autonomy in the great power game through its “third neighbor” strategy, by participating in the “China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor,” and by maintaining “traditional diplomacy” towards Pyongyang. While Seoul’s $546 million trade surplus reflects its technological advantage, Ulaanbaatar’s “not picking sides” strategy constrains its geopolitical ambitions – technological cooperation can increase influence, but excessive involvement in the security field will inevitably face resistance.

Conclusion: 

The essence of Woo Won-shik’s visit to Mongolia is a crucial step for South Korea, taken during a period of constitutional instability, to advance its “technological geopolitics” strategy through parliamentary diplomacy. In the short term, it serves to enhance political stability and influence competition, while in the long term, it aims to reshape the Mongolia-South Korea “technology-resource” symbiotic relationship to break free from the traditional Northeast Asian geopolitical framework and secure more flexible strategic space for South Korea in the great power game.

This diplomatic action, starting from a constitutional crisis and linking directly to business opportunities like the Ulaanbaatar Metro bid, ultimately tests South Korea’s strategic maturity as a middle power – a precise balance between technological empowerment and security prudence will determine the future direction of Korea-Mongolia relations and the potential reshaping of the regional order.

Ч.Сумьяа